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Origin: 2007
Aliases: APT38, Labyrinth Chollima, HIDDEN COBRA, Guardians of Peace, ZINC, NICKEL ACADEMY, Stardust Chollima, BeagleBoyz, Whois Team, Gods Apostles, Gods Disciples, Bluenoroff, Andariel, UNC4736
Targeted Sectors: Government, Military, Financial, Manufacturing, Publishing, Media, Entertainment, Freight, Critical Infrastructure, Blockchain technology and Cryptocurrency Industry
Targeted Regions: East Asia, North America, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, Asia-Pacific, Middle East
Common infection vectors: Social Engineering, Phishing, Disinformation, Zero-Day, Spearphishing, Watering Hole Attack, BYOVD, Trojanized Apps,
Malware Used: YamaBot, LCPDot, DTrack, Mydoom, Dozer malware, RustBucket, COPPERHEDGE, BLINDINGCAN, AppleJeus, wAgent malware, Gopuram backdoor, VEILEDSIGNAL, ICONICSTEALER, DaclsRAT, VHD ransomware, NukeSped, Rifdoor, Phandoor, Andarat, Andaratm, TigerRAT, MagicRAT, EarlyRAT, QuiteRAT, DurianBeacon, AndarLoader, Goat RAT, Black RAT, Gh0st RAT, BADCALL backdoor, VSingle
Motivation: Espionage, Data Theft, Disruptive Attack, Financial Gains
Overview
The Lazarus Group, a shadowy cybercrime organization, has been a persistent threat on the global stage since its emergence in 2007. Linked to the government of North Korea, the Lazarus group has a history spanning over a decade and is responsible for well-known cyberattacks, including the 2014 Sony Pictures attack and the 2017 WannaCry 2.0 ransomware outbreak. What sets Lazarus apart from other state actors is its strong financial motivation, as it seeks to bolster North Korea's struggling economy.
This article delves into the enigmatic world of the Lazarus Group, exploring its history, notable attacks, tactics, mitigation strategies, and the complex web of attribution that surrounds this threat actor.
Attack Tactics and Methods
Lazarus has evolved from a criminal outfit to an advanced persistent threat with a wide array of cyberattack methods and a reputation for audacious heists and disruptive attacks. Its tactics are designed to ensure long-term access to compromised systems and to evade detection. Let’s go through some of its key tactics:
Social Engineering
- Members of the group send carefully crafted emails and messages with malicious attachments or links to high-value targets, often posing as trusted entities.
- One of the popular tactics that attackers use to date is fake job offer lures. It has masqueraded as Lockheed Martin, Coinbase, Northrop Grumman, Crypto.com, BAE Systems, Indeed, ZipRecruiter, and several others.
- In Operation Dream Job, the group impersonated Disney, Google, and Oracle recruiters with fake potential job opportunities and targeted over 250 individuals.
Zero-day Exploits and Vulnerabilities
- Lazarus leveraged the Log4Shell vulnerability to compromise VMware Horizon servers and deploy bespoke malware on energy providers in the U.S, Canada, and Japan.
- Attackers abused a zero-day vulnerability, CVE-2022-0609, in Google Chrome’s web browser to target news media, information technology, cryptocurrency, and finance in the U.S.
- The group often takes an interest in the cybersecurity community and targets them with zero day exploits. They further manipulate them to continue conversations on encrypted messaging platforms, such as Telegram, Signal, etc.
- It exploited the same unpatched zero-day vulnerability twice, targeting a financial business in South Korea.
However, Lazarus’ attacks are not limited to zero day exploits. The group has demonstrated agility and adaptability by exploiting numerous other vulnerabilities, including, EternalBlue, ManageEngine Vulnerability, Log4j, Dell Driver Bug, and others.
Watering Hole Attacks
- In late 2016 when the cryptocurrency bubble was at its peak, Lazarus most likely used the watering holes technique to target cryptocurrency-focused media organizations. These incidents were previously reported under TEMP.Hermit.
- In a particular case, attackers relied on the watering hole tactic for initial access and then exploited a vulnerable and outdated version of Apache Struts2 to execute code on a targeted system.
Supply Chain Attacks
- Lazarus has also been targeting software vendors and compromised their software distribution channels.
- The supply chain attack on VoIP communications company 3CX and JumpCloud was attributed to this group.
Malware and Tools Used
Lazarus APT is renowned for developing and using a diverse arsenal of malware and tools. Most importantly, Lazarus prefers using several custom, self-developed malware families and backdoors designed for its targets. Additionally, the group is known for its persistence techniques; it uses rootkits, backdoors, and living-off-the-land tactics to maintain access to compromised systems, making it difficult for defenders to notice its presence.
For cryptocurrency theft, Lazarus used tools like AppleJeus and ELECTRICFISH to target cryptocurrency exchanges and wallets. While the former was designed to provide unauthorized access and control over infected systems, the latter was used for stealing data from compromised systems. To harvest sensitive information, Lazarus employs keyloggers (such as KiloAlfa and PSLogger) and credential stealers.
Moreover, Lazarus is known for frequently changing its target focus and customizing tools and tactics as per the situation. For example, during the beginning of COVID-19, Lazarus launched phishing campaigns using COVID-19-related lures to target healthcare institutions, research centers, and pharmaceutical companies involved in COVID-19 research and vaccine development.
The DeathNote campaign, which originally began in 2020, marks a major shift in its target as well as updated infection vectors. Lazarus targeted the automotive and academic sectors in Eastern Europe, both of which are connected to the defense industry. Threat actors leveraged an advanced malware called ThreatNeedle in the campaign.
Other notable malware associated with the group involves VHD ransomware, RustBucket, MagicRAT, and more.
Attack Details
The Lazarus Group is known for targeting a wide range of institutions belonging to the government, military, financial, manufacturing, publishing, media, entertainment, international shipping companies, and critical infrastructure industries.
Lazarus has been involved in several high-profile attacks from Operation Troy (2009 to 2012), Sony Pictures Hack (2014), the SWIFT heist (Bancomext, Bangladesh Bank Heist, Banco de Chile, and others), and the WannaCry attack, to Far Eastern International Bank (2017), FASTCash, and DeathNote.
By this time, the North Korean threat had grown enough infrastructure and was ready to wage a war against the blockchain and cryptocurrency industry. Some of its top victims included Coincheck, Bithumb, and Upbit in 2018, meanwhile, Harmony Horizon and Axie Infinity were the major targets in 2022. During 2022, the group accounted for losses exceeding $750 million, constituting roughly 20% of the total stolen value within the industry for that year.
Lazarus in 2023
- Lazarus-affiliated groups have stolen over $240 million in cryptocurrency since June 2023, targeting various businesses, including Atomic Wallet ($100m), CoinsPaid ($37.3M), Alphapo ($60M), and Stake.com ($41M).
- In August 2023, the FBI issued a warning indicating that North Korean hackers were gearing up to cash out stolen cryptocurrency, potentially worth over $40 million in Bitcoin. The agency's investigation had tracked the movement of approximately 1,580 bitcoins, stolen in previous cyberattacks, to six cryptocurrency wallets.
- The latest back-to-back attack on 3CX and JumpCloud signifies its growing interest in the evolving supply chain threat landscape where other global threat actors, such as Cl0p (responsible for the MOVEit breach), also share the stage.
Attribution
The attribution to North Korea in the context of Lazarus Group is often made with a high level of confidence. Cybersecurity researchers have made significant strides in linking Lazarus to North Korea through various means.
Analysis of malware and infrastructure used by Lazarus has revealed code similarities and infrastructure patterns associated with North Korean actors. Its geopolitical motivations often align with North Korea's geopolitical interests. For instance, attacks on South Korean targets have been linked to political tensions between the two countries.
Furthermore, Lazarus is a highly financially motivated threat group. With respect to the attacks on cryptocurrency exchanges, some of the stolen funds have been traced to North Korean wallets. Also, the group's consistent targeting of South Korea and other countries in the region, as well as the use of North Korean infrastructure adds up to the already vetted confidence.
Mitigation
Effectively mitigating threats from the Lazarus APT demands a comprehensive strategy. Key steps include regular patching to thwart known vulnerabilities and following cyber hygiene practices. With supply chain attacks being the primary focus of Lazarus, large enterprises must share threat intelligence collected from their internal monitoring and detection tools as well as threat intelligence collected from ISACs (TLP White/Green) and CISA with their suppliers. More than 95% of suppliers are small sized lack budgets, infrastructure, and expertise to protect themselves from being used as an exploitation route.
Sharing threat intelligence with these suppliers using Cyware’s Collaborate (CSAP) platform protects their supply chain ecosystems by sharing threat intelligence with their suppliers. Collaborate facilitates seamless intelligence and advisory sharing in real time, fostering real-time threat awareness and rapid threat response, ultimately strengthening supply chain ecosystems. Furthermore, enterprise security teams can perform real-time threat assessments of their supply chain ecosystem and assign actions to take protective actions such as patching a vulnerability.
Conclusion
Lazarus APT has earned a fearsome reputation by delivering financial blows to thousands of organizations globally with far-reaching consequences. With a formidable arsenal of malware and tools, this threat actor has successfully targeted governments, financial institutions, and cryptocurrency exchanges, among others. The group operates with impunity possibly due to government backing and encouragement in North Korea, ensuring their safety against prosecution in their own country. This support makes it highly probable that the Lazarus group will persist in its cyber activities for many more years to come.
All these serve as a stark reminder of the need for strong cybersecurity measures in an increasingly interconnected world. Defending against Lazarus APT requires vigilance, constant updates to security measures, and a collaborative approach among organizations and nations.
Indicators of Compromise
QuiteRAT
ED8EC7A8DD089019CFD29143F008FA0951C56A35D73B2E1B274315152D0C0EE6
CollectionRAT
DB6A9934570FA98A93A979E7E0E218E0C9710E5A787B18C6948F2EEDD9338984
773760FD71D52457BA53A314F15DDDB1A74E8B2F5A90E5E150DEA48A21AA76DF
Magic RAT
8CE219552E235DCAF1C694BE122D6339ED4FF8DF70BF358CD165E6EB487CCFC5
C2904DC8BBB569536C742FCA0C51A766E836D0DA8FAC1C1ABD99744E9B50164F
DDA53EEE2C5CB0ABDBF5242F5E82F4DE83898B6A9DD8AA935C2BE29BAFC9A469
90FB0CD574155FD8667D20F97AC464ECA67BDB6A8EE64184159362D45D79B6A4
YamaBot
F226086B5959EB96BD30DEC0FFCBF0F09186CD11721507F416F1C39901ADDAFB
DeimosC2
05e9fe8e9e693cb073ba82096c291145c953ca3a3f8b3974f9c66d15c1a3a11d
Trojanized Plink
e3027062e602c5d1812c039739e2f93fc78341a67b77692567a4690935123abe
Procdump
16F413862EFDA3ABA631D8A7AE2BFFF6D84ACD9F454A7ADAA518C7A8A6F375A5
05732E84DE58A3CC142535431B3AA04EFBE034CC96E837F93C360A6387D8FAAD
Mimikatz
6FBB771CD168B5D076525805D010AE0CD73B39AB1F4E6693148FE18B8F73090B
912018AB3C6B16B39EE84F17745FF0C80A33CEE241013EC35D0281E40C0658D9
CAF6739D50366E18C855E2206A86F64DA90EC1CDF3E309AEB18AC22C6E28DC65
3Proxy
2963A90EB9E499258A67D8231A3124021B42E6C70DACD3AAB36746E51E3CE37E
PuTTY plink
2AA1BBBE47F04627A8EA4E8718AD21F0D50ADF6A32BA4E6133EE46CE2CD13780
5A73FDD0C4D0DEEA80FA13121503B477597761D82CF2CFB0E9D8DF469357E3F8
Adfind
C92C158D7C37FEA795114FA6491FE5F145AD2F8C08776B18AE79DB811E8E36A3
IP Addresses
23.81.246[.]131
146.4.21[.]94
109.248.150[.]13
108.61.186[.]55
1.254.24[.]19
185.152.67[.]39
70.39.103[.]3
66.187.75[.]186
104.223.86[.]8
100.21.104[.]112
23.95.182[.]5
78.141.223[.]50
116.202.251[.]38
89.44.9[.]202
192.185.5[.]189
162.241.248[.]14
179.43.151[.]196
45.82.250[.]186
162.19.3[.]23
144.217.92[.]197
23.29.115[.]171
167.114.188[.]40
91.234.199[.]179
172.93.201[.]253
Domains
nomadpkgs[.]com
centos-repos[.]org
datadog-cloud[.]com
toyourownbeat[.]com
datadog-graph[.]com
centos-pkg[.]org
primerosauxiliosperu[.]com
zscaler-api[.]org
nomadpkg[.]com
launchruse[.]com
Reggedrobin[.]com
Canolagroove[.]com
Alwaysckain[.]com
URLS
hxxp[://]104[.]155[.]149[.]103/2-443[.]ps1
hxxp[://]104[.]155[.]149[.]103/8080[.]ps1
hxxp[://]104[.]155[.]149[.]103/mi64[.]tmp
hxxp[://]104[.]155[.]149[.]103/mi[.]tmp
hxxp[://]104[.]155[.]149[.]103/mm[.]rar
hxxp[://]104[.]155[.]149[.]103/pd64[.]tmp
hxxp[://]104[.]155[.]149[.]103/rar[.]tmp
hxxp[://]104[.]155[.]149[.]103/spr[.]tmp
hxxp[://]104[.]155[.]149[.]103/t[.]tmp
hxxp[://]104[.]155[.]149[.]103/update[.]tmp
hxxp[://]109[.]248[.]150[.]13:8080/1
hxxp[://]146[.]4[.]21[.]94/tmp/data_preview/virtual[.]php
hxxp[://]185[.]29[.]8[.]162:443/1[.]tmp
hxxp[://]40[.]121[.]90[.]194/11[.]jpg
hxxp[://]40[.]121[.]90[.]194/300dr[.]cert
hxxp[://]40[.]121[.]90[.]194/b[.]cert
hxxp[://]40[.]121[.]90[.]194/qq[.]cert
hxxp[://]40[.]121[.]90[.]194/ra[.]cert
hxxp[://]40[.]121[.]90[.]194/Rar[.]jpg
hxxp[://]40[.]121[.]90[.]194/tt[.]rar
hxxp[://]46[.]183[.]221[.]109//dfdfdfdfdfdfdfdfdfaflakjdfljaldjfladfljaldkfjlajdsflajdskf/huntertroy[.]exe
hxxp[://]46[.]183[.]221[.]109//dfdfdfdfdfdfdfdfdfaflakjdfljaldjfladfljaldkfjlajdsflajdskf/svhostw[.]exe
hxxp[://]84[.]38[.]133[.]145/board[.]html
hxxp[://]84[.]38[.]133[.]145/header[.]xml
hxxp[://]www[.]ajoa[.]org/home/manager/template/calendar[.]php
hxxp[://]www[.]ajoa[.]org/home/rar[.]tmp
hxxp[://]www[.]ajoa[.]org/home/tmp[.]ps1
hxxp[://]www[.]ajoa[.]org/home/ztt[.]tmp
hxxp[://]www[.]orvi00[.]com/ez/admin/shop/powerline[.]tmp
Networks IOCs
146[.]4[.]21[.]94
109[.]248[.]150[.]13
108[.]61[.]186[.]55:443
hxxp[://]146[.]4[.]21[.]94/tmp/tmp/comp[.]dat
hxxp[://]146[.]4[.]21[.]94/tmp/tmp/log[.]php
hxxp[://]146[.]4[.]21[.]94/tmp/tmp/logs[.]php
hxxp[://]ec2-15-207-207-64[.]ap-south-1[.]compute[.]amazonaws[.]com/resource/main/rawmail[.]php
hxxp[://]109[.]248[.]150[.]13/EsaFin[.]exe
hxxp[://]146[.]4[.]21[.]94/boards/boardindex[.]php
hxxp[://]146[.]4[.]21[.]94/editor/common/cmod
VSingle C2s
hxxps[://]tecnojournals[.]com/review
hxxps[://]semiconductboard[.]com/xml
hxxp[://]cyancow[.]com/find
MagicRAT C2s
hxxp[://]155[.]94[.]210[.]11/news/page[.]php
hxxp[://]192[.]186[.]183[.]133/bbs/board[.]php
hxxp[://]213[.]32[.]46[.]0/board[.]php
hxxp[://]54[.]68[.]42[.]4/mainboard[.]php
hxxp[://]84[.]38[.]133[.]145/apollom/jeus[.]php
hxxp[://]mudeungsan[.]or[.]kr/gbbs/bbs/template/g_botton[.]php
hxxp[://]www[.]easyview[.]kr/board/Kheader[.]php
hxxp[://]www[.]easyview[.]kr/board/mb_admin[.]php
YamaBot C2s
hxxp[://]213[.]180[.]180[.]154/editor/session/aaa000/support[.]php
MD5
8A05F6B3F1EB25BCBCEB717AA49999CD
265F407A157AB0ED017DD18CAE0352AE
7A73A2261E20BDB8D24A4FB252801DB7
7A307C57EC33A23CE9B5C84659F133CC
CED38B728470C63ABCF4DB013B09CFF7
9121F1C13955506E33894FFD780940CD
50B2154DE64724A2A930904354B5D77D
EE73A772B72A5F3393D4BF577FC48EFE
D1C652B4192857CB08907F0BA1790976
25B37C971FD7E9E50E45691AA86E5F0A
0493F40628995AE1B7E3FFACD675BA5F
8840F6D2175683C7ED8AC2333C78451A
C278D6468896AF3699E058786A8C3D62
9FD35BAD075C2C70678C65C788B91BC3
59CB8474930AE7EA45B626443E01B66D
7AF59D16CFD0802144795CA496E8111C
CD5357D1045948BA62710AD8128AE282
77194024294F4FD7A4011737861CCE3C
E9D89D1364BD73327E266D673D6C8ACF
0D4BDFEC1E657D6C6260C42FFDBB8CAB
5DA86ADEEC6CE4556F477D9795E73E90
706E55AF384E1D8483D2748107CBD57C
DD185E2BB02B21E59FB958A4E12689A7
4088946632E75498D9C478DA782AA880
4C239A926676087E31D82E79E838CED1
183AD96B931733AD37BB627A958837DB
9EA365C1714EB500E5F4A749A3ED0FE7
2449F61195E39F6264D4244DFA1D1613
1F254DD0B85EDD7E11339681979E3AD6
0071B20D27A24AE1E474145B8EFC9718
65DF11DEA0C1D0F0304B376787E65CCB
2EFBE6901FC3F479BC32AAF13CE8CF12
880B263B4FD5DE0AE6224189EA611023
E7AA0237FC3DB67A96EBD877806A2C88
56470E113479EACDA081C2EEEAD153BF
F4B55DA7870E9ECD5F3F565F40490996
1BD0CA304CDECFA3BD4342B261285A72
14D79CD918B4F610C1A6D43CADEEFF7B
C0A8483B836EFDBAE190CC069129D5C3
CA6658852480C70118FEBA12EB1BE880
EB2DC282AD3AB29C1853D4F6D09BEC4F
7D204793E75BB49D857BF4DBC60792D3
FC7B0764541225E5505FA93A7376DF4
075FBA0C098D86D9F22B8EA8C3033207
92657B98C2B4EE4E8FA1B83921003C74
78D42CEDB0C012C62EF5BE620C200D43
F6D6F3580160CD29B285EDF7D0C647CE
11FDC0BE9D85B4FF1FAF5CA33CC272ED
2B02465B65024336A9E15D7F34C1F5D9
CBC559EA38D940BF0B8307761EE4D67B
DA1DC5D41DE5F241CABD7F79FBC407F5
B3A8C88297DAECDB9B0AC54A3C107797
B23B0DE308E55CBF14179D59ADEE5FCB
64E5ACF43613CD10E96174F36CB1D680
C027D641C4C1E9D9AD048CDA2AF85DB6
C90D094A8FBEAA8A0083C7372BFC1897
853341A37EE6CD6516E03CE1341C7889
82491B42B9A2D34B13137E36784A67D7
7BA98EDD7015779A2625F11F3EABE869
3A9C24C92C221658A8BF9CE61D758E1A
B8724109E5473B4CA79A13C33B865E32
DC9244206E72A04D30EEADEF23713778
735AFCD0F6821CBD3A2DB510EA8FEB22
SHA-1
38B0DBA5045D7324F45E31249A1FBA5D086C1AC5
13C47E19182454EFA60890656244EE11C76B4904
720E60D0AFA4ED1718A68866740D4D4EEF963B8D
BAB4485B7F699723319B88A5E097B62B028563EF
4CF23D9A5EA4AD3F331FC35FF237D33875EA9A8E
89631469CF45EBAFC103829651B0F284F2CEEABC
033A15778AE9AF48466E0B39D123F492C8035665
63F974136C871E0FA4F14932873DD136E0B45AA5
659C854BBDEFE692EE8C52761E7A8C7EE35AA56C
975AE81997E6CD8C8A3901308D33C868F23E638F
35577959F79966B01F520E2F0283969155B8F8D7
988D07E40FD201CCEAAE5FEB29FEA2DB13846D7A
27E5B8CF9E23346649C9D95EC54287C094651BE5
F3847F5DE342632F8F9E2901F16B7127472493AE
88069CB17AB766F2D4F68D679D11DCD844BCFB27
43CA84252A84BEDC468E5C963A288966D6376CA3
323E1F522F18415F8EEF337A3551A736B69683D2
4B58ED2EC3A3104024DBA0BB0E4256D6B05D0D10
9ABB433B603D950B6CD59C92F0A818F012090896
AF5C411566FE993674E01308A5058E43CD0A5800
A1271B12DD7EFDAF30A5FD65B2FBBA2471F4326D
5D06679C25B8A8C4979194B67005F58535C12A13
4AAB3433616D37ED12F37151123C3F67C6DEFD7F
F938D0CA9233770A5E06658C68E800B98188D01B
2BEF437C6E7ED3C438D23E6CAC0A7FFB9D2F3E26
7F8455524BD987F5A0EF887D73092C72BDCD1AEA
20C3940DBD21464B5A1538C154A443BC858F38AD
BD178402B7B806BAC3CBFEB7141E80C2177AA703
B4D72C236E3CD58D9F92C099DD2628163C3A05FB
6A82EBF8A6E868323B1DE30A81CD6658CE4C31B6
C0D6BD29DAA7D80B07E339FC48868639123E75A1
7A58BA290EAC891BE743FFD1A74115799529873E
D705711BFDBCB2B583A0E740AF349589484D84A8
0ECC687D741C7B009C648EF0DE0A5D47213F37FF
C70EDFAF2C33647D531F7DF76CD4E5BB4E79EA2E
4C729E0E247CFA7A4B047E463BC6E34EA4298E3B
C699826810A8E3FCB1408A53E1D75714385ED716
ECD042EABDEAE16532B9602BE5786E408C3A622D
83C9095718DDD20CF287F5750256C00538CCD48F
8119475CA51654D6DF7391C6844E8CBBFEA2FCB7
5C2277E3E11F1053698A6DEE90937992993F9AF9
46F7B47D2F9CDB6A6D7522CE20D0C10314DE8BAD
C02A8450F93CA0D003D7B1DB2BE0253BBFF7CCE6
B9D25359820C2FA990868764634A06E024201542
B84A1747F9672409A5DAAD0910681A9D33AA016F
ED77B0DD1FE8A9C2AE7991333DE550596FFB6FCC
CEAF57F23EDE93307DA84ABF07BCF137D258F55D
BAAE100337B76BE346C3460711A0C413E639C7E1
AA8214C2949BBF66C11A5E27F0E09A13427F5FAA
C577D177D3A6D94B75483A89AA196C4B7AE5F1FE
B256F22A81DAA47D250782515912B13EF8C27390
46660F562FE01B5DF0E1AC03DD44B4CC8D2FA5F5
B57665909A6F6743DC3EC3476EF0C30252B78A6A
14B91C090048030088423FE1ACF17C8457AE098B
F141F9DFC7E082521C9D26980BFC8BF100BB2F61
97E9C7091A7275655D0E44559A3DF6D5A0CF21D9
6FF55C00A1C09CCD6AF7727D526E21CA969E0AF0
1DF16F8BB6068E5F65F0A9A3613CC31FE5321A8D
10408E6CF829699F0EB4C5199575261DB14FEE66
92480E506D51D920FCC1D4DBA7206C3185317F61
CB0E71340F963F7F2F404A0431D82AC809D2B15D
SHA-256
C26B8D9B9C76770D5EADD0DC11A2382DB1E5175E4E0EB69B6481D5A94747ABAE
1A172D92638E6FDB2858DCCA7A78D4B03C424B7F14BE75C2FD479F59049BC5F9
919DFA31F284412D41E45A90520DE2BACD211E7AD92D68512108F1302385C79F
383E75C5BDD46D1B6FF517CC3FAD88EB92C22AA9E969686DE4514CD665A1757A
2873D85E9129D8F54FB989D3D7BF3CA660601688DF4FFCF6D19EE3D5D0C8C0B1
77A94EA53961CB80A19E23B152CE1F92B91EF119CF9291D37B8C52C17E8D4263
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Posted on: September 25, 2023
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